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The Norwegian Supreme Court recently pronounced its first ruling on a case which
started with investigations by the Finnmark Commission. The Stjernøy Case1 arises
from a title claim to land used as pasture by two groups of Sa´mi reindeer herders.
A contributory reason for the claim was that there are mining activities on the island,
from which the landowner is entitled to benefit according to the Norwegian Mineral
Act. The Supreme Court ruling raises some fundamental questions, among others:
what is the significance of ILO 169 in relation to the Finnmark Act?
Norway’s obligations under ILO 169
The land rights identification process underway in Finnmark, the most central Sa´mi
region in Norway, is the result of more than 30 years of political discussions, tug of
war, and struggle for Sa´mi rights to land and water. After the Bondevik Government
presented its bill for a Finnmark Act in 2003, which was met with broad criticism,
consultations between the Sami Parliament and the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Justice led to a joint recognition that an investigation of land rights
was needed to meet Norway’s obligations under ILO 169 concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169). Thirteen years earlier, Norway
was the first country in the world to ratify ILO 169.
The Norwegian Parliament consequently decided that the 2005 Norwegian
Finnmark Act was to be applied within the limitations of ILO 169. This was
not only a ratification but also an incorporation of ILO 169 into the Finnmark
Act. Through the Act, Norway has established several institutions to meet ILO
obligations. These consist among others of a two-stage procedure with an investigat-
ing body called the Finnmark Commission, and a court of law, the Uncultivated Land
Tribunal for Finnmark. These two bodies have been given the mandate to investigate
land rights and settle land disputes, falling directly under Norway’s obligations under
ILO 169 art. 14 nos 2 and 3, which read:
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2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands, which the
peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of
their rights of ownership and possession.
3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to
resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.
Finally, cases can be brought to the Supreme Court of Norway, and eventually
to international monitoring bodies. The Finnmark Estate, which has the mandate
to own and govern the land of Finnmark until an investigative body has determined
the lawful owner, also falls under the auspices of ILO, which has not been
discussed here.
The Finnmark Commission, established in 2008, has, after completing investiga-
tions of five areas, not recognised any particular Sa´mi collectively owned land
or usage rights. The Stjernøy ruling, pronounced 28 September 2016, is the
first Supreme Court Case to arise from these investigations. Whatever one may
think about the outcome, the case is interesting from several perspectives, and not
primarily because of its substantial outcome. One particular reason is that this is the
first time the Supreme Court of Norway has discussed the significance of ILO 169’s
incorporation into the Finnmark Act. In addition, the Court elaborates on the
significance of the state’s former ownership in relation to the position of the current
landowner, the Finnmark Estate.
Between the lines, one reads that a claim from descendants of the coastal Sa´mi
population that inhabited the island before it fell under the Norwegian state’s
domain would have had a better chance of succeeding with a claim. At the same
time, the Supreme Court indicates that the recognition of the title under the rules on
immemorial usage should not be a low threshold offer.
The significance of previous state ownership in Finnmark
Discussing the significance of previous state ownership in Finnmark, the Supreme
Court stated that the government’s former legal and factual activities as land owner
and administrator of Finnmark should ‘in a general way be included as factors in the
assessment of claims for property rights on the basis of immemorial usage’ (paragraph
73, my emphasis). This means that government decisions and actions are significant,
but hardly to the degree that the Finnmark Commission has assumed in its previous
reports. The analogy to general property law means that legal activities, especially if
they are carried out as part of exercising public authority, are of little importance
when it comes to establishing use and ownership rights for the state.
At the same time, the position of the Supreme Court means that it does not
support the legislator’s intention, including the Sa´mi Parliament’s, that the State’s
prior ownership cannot be given weight under the identification and recognition
process. This understanding was a central element in the settlement between the
Sa´mi Parliament and the Standing Committee of Justice during the consultations
that led up to the Finnmark Act. It was based on a mutual recognition that state
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ownership was built on dubious premises and partly inaccurate history perceptions,
which in turn meant that ownership could not be sustained and could not form a
basis for FeFo rights and ownership.
The significance of ILO 169 incorporation
Although Norway has ratified ILO 169, it has not been incorporated into Norwegian
law through the 1999 Norwegian Human Rights Act, as have general international
human rights conventions such as the ICCPR, ICESCR, UNCRC, CEDAW, and
the ECHR, which is a prerequisite for it to be legal enforceable with precedence
in the Norwegian dualistic legal system. However, ILO 169 is incorporated into
Norwegian law through the Finnmark Act section 3, as the first sentence states
that ‘[t]he Act shall apply with the limitations that follow from ILO Convention
No. 169 . . .’. The phrase ‘with the limitations’ does not mean that it has a limited
impact, but that incorporation is limited to cover the Finnmark Act.
The Draft documents use the formulation ‘a limited incorporation’, which means
that ‘the law should apply with the limitations imposed by the ILO Convention’.
This means according to legislators that:
The ILO Convention takes precedence over the Finnmark Act if it should be shown
that the provisions of the Act are in conflict with provisions of the ILO Convention.
If, however, one finds on the basis of the ILO Convention, that the Act lacks
provisions of certain content, this will be a task for the legislature. The Court
should, in other words not to use the ILO Convention to build out the Finnmark
Act. It will be easier to foresee the consequences of such a limited incorporation
than if one were to give the ILO Convention general precedence over all Norwegian
legislation.2
It has generally been perceived that the ILO 169 takes precedence in the area of the
Finnmark Act, including transactions the Finnmark Act regulates. However, the
Supreme Court has a far narrower interpretation of the incorporation and has found
that it ‘was intended to be limited to the provisions of the Finnmark Act’. The first
voting judge, who pronounced the judgement, stated that even if the Finnmark Act
governs the procedures to clarify property rights, ‘it does not regulate the substantive
rules that the rights should be clarified on the basis of’ (paragraph 76, highlighted by
first voting).
This is probably an appropriate interpretation based on the draft documents.
However, it narrows the significance of ILO 169. It implies that ILO 169, includ-
ing Article 14(1), which states ‘the concerned peoples’ rights of ownership and
possession of the lands which they traditionally occupy, shall be recognized’, is not
given independent significance as a rule of law in the legal identification process
framed in the Finnmark Act.
Although the draft documents are to be understood in this way, there is reason to
ask if this is an accurate interpretation assessed in terms of the intention and opinion
of the legislators. My reason for asking is that it seems strange if legislators only
intended to safeguard the wording of the Finnmark Act from conflicting with ILO
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169, which hardly could have come about due to typos or poor legal craftsmanship.
The draft documents, particularly the position of the Sa´mi Parliament, indicate that
incorporation was intended to have a broader scope, protecting Sa´mi customs, and
customary law during the legal identification process in the Sa´mi area.
With the narrow interpretation of the incorporation of ILO 169, there is a reason
to ask if Norway will be able to meet its obligations under the convention. That
said, it must be taken into consideration that the Supreme Court emphasises that
in applying the property law in relation to the Finnmark Act, Article 14 affects
‘the application of law through the so-called presumption principle’ (paragraph 77).
This principle states that Norwegian law as far as possible shall be interpreted
in accordance with international law. Moreover, the Supreme Court highlights the
importance of the Selbu and Svartskog cases,3 referring again to the draft docu-
ments, which state:
. . . the Sa´mi use and the Sa´mi perspective and attitude to ownership position, was
emphasized for the decision. In the Selbu Case this was particularly evident in the
assessment of nomadic use, and in the Svartskog Case this was reflected in
the assessment of good faith and with respect to traditional Sami customary law of
the property concept (paragraph 84).
The Supreme Court concludes that Sa´mi customs and customary law should
be given significant weight*considerations we have not seen too much of in the
Finnmark Commission investigations thus far. In this regard, one can ask if the
Supreme Court’s rejection of ILO 169 article 14 as an independent, material rule,
will have any great practical significance.
NOTES
1. The Norwegian Supreme Court, Stjernøy Reindeer Husbandry district and Johan J. Sara
et al. versus the Finnmark Estate, 28 September 2016, HR-2016-2030-A.
2. Inst. O. nr. 80 (20042005) Innstilling fra justiskomiteen om lov om rettsforhold og
forvaltning av grunn og naturressurser i Finnmark (the Finnmark Act), p. 33.
3. NRt 2001 p. 769 et seq and NRt 2001 p. 1229 et seq.
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